DISCORD IN U.S.-MEXICAN LABOR RELATIONS AND THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION

by

Edward J Williams, Ph.D.

Professor of Political Science

University of Arizona

Tucson AZ 85721

Phone: 520-621-7600; Fax: 520-621-5051

Email: edwardw@u.arizona.edu

A paper presented at an international seminar, "Mexico y su interacción con el sistema político estadoundidense" Mexico City, January, 1996

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

THE CONTEXT: UNION DEBILITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Labor Union Debility

Binational Cooperative Initiatives

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN MEXICAN AND U.S. LABOR

The United States

Mexico

Unions and Social Action Groups Compared

THE NAALC AND THE NAFTA CONNECTION

CONCLUSIONS

ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTION

The North American Free Trade Agreement has contributed to significant new departures in United States-Mexican cooperation. The two governments grow ever closer; business communities in the two nations evolve a more intimate relationship; police forces on both side of the international line develop cooperative accords; environmentalists in Mexico and the United States work hand in glove; and a host of other collaborative initiatives combine to define a new cooperative reality for the bilateral relationship.

Organized labor in the two countries provides a glaring exception to the general trend. The coming of the NAFTA seems to deny the age-old ambition for working class solidarity once again as organized labor in Mexico and the United States concoct programs that frustrate bilateral cooperation. The framing and initial implementation of the NAFTA labor side accord, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), has not made matters any better.

A description and analysis of those initiatives defines the purpose of this paper. The discussion emphasizes the signifi- cant divisions between the two labor union movements and the implications of the NAALC as it has been conceived and initially applied in Mexico and the U.S. The paper divides into four parts. After this introduction, the first section sets the scene by explaining two contextual foci: a short interpretation of the trends and forces that have diminished the political punch of the Mexican and U.S. labor movements and a discussion of other binational groups that have been successful in evolving cooperative initiatives. The discussion proceeds to the crux of the matter: 1) an examination of the influences that have impeded Mexican and U.S. labor from seeking cooperative strategies; 2) a description and analysis of the NAALC and its initial execution, highlighting the conclusion that the Agreement will not contribute to bilateral cooperation between the Confed- eracion de Trabajadores (CTM) and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). The final section of the paper sets out some projections and conclusions.

THE CONTEXT: UNION DEBILITY AND BILATERAL COOPERATION

Two contextual factors suggest the need for cooperative initiatives between organized labor in the United States and Mexico. In the first instance, the labor movements in both countries become ever weaker as neo-liberal ideologies wax increasingly formidable. International solidarity should be a strategy to revive organized labor's waning political potency in Mexico and the United States.

Secondly, other forces pursue binational initiatives quite successfully. Governments cooperate, businessmen launch joint ventures, environmentalists offer mutual assistance, human rights groups collaborate, drug mafias co-conspire, etc. In the process, singularly and in tandem each of those binational groups prospers and increases its influence in each country.

The logic of the analysis suggests that those flourishing binational initiatives would provide a pattern to be embraced by organized labor in Mexico and the U.S. Solidarity, of course, defines the rallying cry and fundamental logic of the labor movement. But, organized labor in the two nations remains divided as its political influence sinks into further decline.

Labor Union Debility

The decline of the Mexican and U.S. labor movements is far too obvious to spark serious debate. The causes differ to some degree in the two countries, but they also share several common origins: the global ideological fashion of neo-Liberalism, the changing characteristics of the two nations' economies, and the disreputable image of labor leaders.

As both cause and effect of the neo-liberal movement, governmental and private interests in the U.S. and Mexico have been re-organizing their economies in a spree of down-sizing, privatization, liquidation, and restructuring. Every one of those initiatives diminished the strength and influence of organized labor on both sides of the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo.

An abbreviated litany of business and governmental strate- gies in the U.S. captures the sense of the influences chipping away at labor's position. Downsizing and mergers by the nation's largest companies' eliminated 4.7 million jobs in the decade stretching from 1984 thru 1993. In 1994, another half million jobs were cut. The clear majority of those millions of lost jobs came from relatively well-paying, labor organized industries.1

When American business enjoyed prosperity, overtime and temporary workers frequently filled the positions eliminated earlier and outsourcing programs expanded. Temporary employees are almost totally unorganized, and outsourcing frequently replaces parts of the productive process done by well-paid organized workers with unorganized, lower-wage labor.

While those strategies contributed mightily to organized labor's relative debility, the U.S. labor movement's own sins weighed in the balance. U.S. labor unions have been frequently corrupt, arrogant, and out of touch with the changing charac- teristics of the United States' and world economies.

Table One sets out the data on U.S. organized labor's decline. Absolute membership increased from 1945 to 1975 with marginal increases continuing thru 1980, when the absolute numbers of union members went into decline. The data on member- ship as a percentage of he overall workforce tell the more important tale. After a peak relative membership in 1945, the percentage figure dropped ten percent in 30 years, and another ten percent in about another ten years.

Table One

U.S. Union Membership, Selected Years

Year Union Membership* Membership as a % of Workforce

1945 14,300,000 35.5

1975 19,600,000 25.5

1992 16,400,000 15.8

Source: The World Almanac (Mahwah, NJ: World Almanac, 1994),p.141

* Rounded to the nearest one hundred thousand.

Like the United States, Mexican organized labor is in decline. As Mexican policy makers confected policies and programs in response to economic crisis during the 1980s and again after 1994, the symbiotic partnership between government and labor suffered debilitating stresses and strains.

The causes of the decline of organized labor emanate from a series of post-1982 and post 1994 policies and programs designed to overcome the ravages of economic crisis and "modernize" the economy and the polity. The policies included wage fixing under government-sponsored pactos; a series of privatizations, liqui- dations and restructurings; and the negative economic fallout of trade liberalization.

Wage fixing began with the austerity programs initiated immediately after Miguel de la Madrid's accession to power in 1982. As the government's programs were applied, real wages fell precipitously.2 The economic crisis beginning in late 1994 signified more misery for Mexico's workers as the screws tighten- ed and the workers sacrificed.

In the same mold as downsizing in the U.S., Mexico's liquidations, restructurings and privatizations spelled another series of negative impacts upon workers and organized labor. Heberto Castillo counted 200,000 jobs lost in 1989. Another source quoted 400,000 lost from 1982 thru mid-1993. This research could confirm neither figure, but the numbers were clearly large. The ranks of the unemployed multiplied again with the economic crisis sparked by the crisis of 1994-1995.3

Threatening demographic trends also contributed their negative influences to the problems of Mexican organized labor. The Mexican labor force more than tripled between 1950 and 1990 while available jobs trailed behind, particularly since 1982. Projections predict another increase in the labor force of nearly 50 percent by between 1990 and 2005. Mexico's labor force increases by about a million workers each year, sabotaging the best laid plans of organized labor as worker supply far outstrips demand.4

In response, Mexican organized labor has pursued a series of strategies ranging from opposition thru collaboration with governmental policies and programs, but the Mexican movimiento sindical has repudiated a policy of international solidarity with its U.S. counterpart. The conservative, parochial posture of Mexican and U.S. labor appears all the more puzzling in the context of binational initiatives by other groups. A review of those initiatives provides another touch of context for the analysis.

Binational Cooperative Initiatives

As United States and Mexican labor unions shirk interna- tional cooperation and see their influence wither, other binational groups embrace cooperative initiatives and increase their wealth and influence. Those initiatives include business ventures between U.S. and Mexican interests and governmental cooperation between Mexico City and Washington. Even more germane for the analysis of labor union solidarity, the ventures also count successful binational cooperation between public health proponents, environmentalists, human rights organizations, and labor rights advocates. In every case, those groups champion many of the same causes and argue many of the same issues as organized labor in Mexico and the United States. On the focus of this analysis, their effective collaboration accentuates the dismal failure of labor unions to evolve similar success on similar problems and issues.

The 1994 NAFTA accord consecrates official governmental cooperation, of course, but the partnership is both more mature and more enveloping than reciprocal trade and investment. The intimate bilateral relationship has been evolving at least since the Carter Administration issued Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM 41) in 1978 elevating Mexico to the first dimension of U.S. foreign policy interests.

Myriad joint ventures by Mexican and U.S. businesses flourish, defining a trend quite different from the void of cooperation between labor union groups. The trade and development corridors evolving in the binational Borderlands provide especially cogent examples. The economic logistics of the NAFTA have catalyzed intriguing initiatives between Mexicans and "Americans" as they unite in the Borderlands to compete with other groups of Mexicans and Americans in the binational corridors. San Antonio-Dos Laredos-Monterrey stands as the most powerful binational coalition in the mid-1990s, but other groups also compete--an example is the Arizona-Sonora corridor composed of Phoenix-Tucson-Ambos Nogales-Hermosillo-Guaymas.5

Governmental and business cooperation form dimensions of the larger scenario, but they really have less relevance for the case at hand than other cooperative ventures which strike closer to the analysis of binational organized labor. Mexican-U.S. binational public health, social action, human rights and environmental groups also cooperate widely and effectively.6

Binational cooperation amongst environmentalists began in the early 1980s, but moved into a new stage with the broaching of the NAFTA in the early 1990s. NAFTA riveted attention on the environmental degradation of the binational borderlands, sparking the formation of organizations on both sides of the international line and linking several into effective examples of international cooperation.

A catalog and description of those binational organizations goes beyond the ken of this essay, but a listing of several serves the point. In Texas and Nuevo León, the Texas Center for Policy Studies has joined with Bioconservación of Monterrey to pursue the Binational Project on the Environment. In West Texas and southeast New Mexico, the International Environmental Alliance of the Bravo organizes more than 10 organizations from both sides of the Rio Bravo/Rio Grande. In New Mexico, the International Transboundary Resources Center (Centro Interna- cional de Recursos Transfrontorizos) works with like-minded Mexican counterparts in several locations.

Similar groups contend environmental and health issues in Arizona and California. The Northeastern Sonora-Cochise County Health Council (NSCCHC) cooperates with the Red Fronteriza de Salud y Ambiente, based in Hermosillo, Sonora. In southwestern Arizona, the International Sonoran Desert Alliance boasts three national affiliates: Mexican, U.S., and Native American Tohono O'odham living on both sides of the line. In California, the San Diego Environmental Health Coalition cooperates with the Tijuana-based Comite Ciudadano Pro Restauración del Canon del Padre on a series of environmental issues.

A number of Mexican-United States binational organizations also cooperate in the defense of human rights. Amnesty Inter- national includes chapters in Mexico and the U.S. In the 1980s, the Sanctuary/ Santuario movement encompassed adherents in both countries. The American Friends and Mexican Amigos are probably the best known of these human rights organizations.7

Binational public and environmental health advocates also form part of the collective of groups and organizations that mobilize voters, monitor human rights, protect the environment, and nurture cross border cooperation. The United States-Mexico Border Health Foundation defines the most significant recent progress in the field. It should be functioning by 1996.

Finally, binational labor rights groups also illustrate examples of collaborative initiatives that cover the territory. Altho it goes beyond the single-issue of labor rights, the binational Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras (CJM) forms the most important of these groups. In the labor area, the CJM

concentrates on measures to implement new policies governing hours, working conditions, safety standards, etc.

In contrast to the mainstream of organized labor in Mexico and the U.S., every one of these initiatives represent bi- national cooperation. Furthermore, every one reflects the dynamic toward international collaboration symbolized by the NAFTA. They include bureaucrats, businessmen, environmentalists, social activists, and human rights advocates (not to mention criminals)--but not the peak representatives of organized labor in Mexico and the U.S.

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN MEXICAN AND U.S.LABOR

THOUGHT AND PRACTICE

Mexican and American trade unionists betray a series of cultural, socio-economic, and political attitudes and positions that militate against an internationalist position. In both countries nationalism and political alliances with government play into the mix. In the U.S., labor's traditional commitment to protectionism assumes significance. In Mexico, the authori- tarian characteristics of the system help explain organized labor's reluctance to push international solidarity with its U.S. counterpart. In both countries, finally, jobs for working men and women play mightily in the analysis. In the United States, the specter of jobs lost to Mexico significantly influences organized labor's strategy. On the other hand, the hope of jobs gained in Mexico informs the strategy of organized labor. In both countries, the NAFTA and the side agreement on North American Labor Cooperation have complicated the calculation.

The United States

Examining first the United States side of the binational equation, the inhibitions to international cooperation run the gamut from the general to the particular, from attitudinal disposition to political calculations. At a macro level of analysis, labor chieftains in the United States share the isolationist prejudice that weaves its way thru the American historical tradition. That feeling reflects a certain arrogance in the minds of Americans that has convinced many that the U.S. needs no allies. In the context of organized labor, the prejudice contributes to the U.S. rejection of solidarity with its fraternal organization in Mexico, or elsewhere.

The major thrust of U.S. labor's foreign trade policy aims at the protection of U.S. jobs. With the exception of a short-lived foray into internationalism when it supported President John F. Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act of 1962, labor's position has been staunchly protectionist. For others, the expansion of trade may imply positive contributions like economic growth, lower consumer prices, and increased international understanding, but for U.S. labor the implications are quite different. Expand- ed international trade spells the loss of American jobs and the erosion of organized labor's influence.8

Moreover, U.S. organized labor's post war international experience has been preoccupied with its role in the U.S. anti-communist crusade. U.S. unions have occasionally cooperated with their foreign brethren, but not necessarily to increase wages or improve working conditions. Rather, the thrust has been to battle Communist-dominated unions in Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Italy, and elsewhere.

From another analytical perspective, U.S. labor's long-lived repudiation of consciously articulated theoretical formulations also diminishes its proclivity to offer serious consideration to the advantages of international solidarity with its Mexican counterpart. With occasional exceptions best exemplified by the United Auto Workers and the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union, American labor's concentration on bread and butter issues inhibits a larger vision of the meaning of working class solidarity and its many nuances and extrapolations, includ- ing international cooperation.

Combining the sense of a couple of the previous perspec- tives, U.S. labor's attitude toward working men and women in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) like Mexico also reflects contradic- tion and ambivalence. On the one hand, a genuine sympathy for poor and exploited Mexican workers characterizes the U.S. response. On the other hand, of course, Mexican and other Third World workers strike at the very heart of Unites States' organized labor's priority interest. Foreign workers define competition and the loss of U.S. jobs.

In the best of the analytical critiques, the self- aggrandizing practices of multinationals in league with weak, pliant, and corrupt Third World governments offer a context to explain the competition from poor working men and women in LDCs and suggest the wisdom of international solidarity. But, the sophisticated analysis frequently gets lost in the translation, and Mexican and other Third World workers become primarily competition for scarce jobs.

Finally, American racism forms part of the complexity of the response. As always, racial prejudices frequently complicate American and other international actors' attitudes and negatively impact the inclination and/or the ability of Americans to evolve fruitful cooperation with Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans.

All of those factors have combined to constrain U.S. organized labor from moving toward a policy of authentic and com- prehensive cooperation with Mexican labor in previous times and in the mid-1990s. Several factors weigh just as heavily from south of the Rio Grande where Mexican labor has been equally reluctant to embrace a policy of proletarian solidarity.

Mexico

Similar and different factors weigh into an analysis of Mexico's organized labor's position on cooperation with its U.S. counterpart. In a somewhat comparable nationalistic context, Mexico's labor union leaders remain ill-disposed to join their United States counterparts. In a rather different political context, furthermore, Mexico's labor union leaders operate in a semi-authoritarian system; the heavy hand of governmental power

comes quite close to dictating the policies and programs of Mexico's movimiento sindical.

The analysis from Mexican authoritarianism runs straight forward. Mexico's governing elites mandate the formulation and implementation of the policies and programs formally promulgated by Mexican organized labor. Indeed, the role of government became more assertive during the 1980s and 1990s. Government purged a number of Mexican labor leaders and imprisoned others in a campaign launched by de la Madrid and intensified by Salinas de Gortari. Mexico's labor leaders fell into line, pledging their support to the "modernization" of the Mexican economy.

NAFTA formed a keystone of the modernization program. To the person, Mexico's labor leaders promoted the trade agreement, admittedly some more enthusiastically than others. In that con- text, they contradicted their U.S. counterparts who vociferously opposed the free trade treaty. Mexico's labor leaders continued their support of the treaty in the mid-1990s.

In the mid-1990s, U.S. labor leaders seek the cooperation of their Mexican brethren to raise wages and improve working condi- tions for Mexican workers, thereby increasing production costs in Mexico. The de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo administrations have opposed the goals of U.S. unions. Mexico's labor leaders support the government, at least partly because uncooperative labor leaders in Mexico are purged and/or end their careers in jail.

Hence, Mexican labor leaders eschew cooperative arrange- ments with U.S. organized labor. A Mexican analyst gets to the point in complaining that Mexican organized labor suffers from a state of limbo. While the sindicatos claim formal representation of working men and women, "their interests and their activities continue to be defined by the will of the politically powerful, especially the federal government."9

But, that fact forms only part of the picture. The analysis also needs to emphasize that personal authoritarianism, national- ism and developmentalism define the values of Mexican labor leaders. An evaluation of labor chief Fidel Velásquez captures a component of the analysis. In the words of Kevin Middlebrook, Fidel is "heavy on discipline, including for himself and in relationship to the government and to the president." Such a personality shirks from challenging governmental elites.10

Perhaps even more importantly, Velásquez and other Mexican labor leaders are nationalists. Middlebrook defines Velásquez' political beliefs as being characterized by "conservative nationalism."11 Hence, Mexican labor protects national dignity and promotes national development. As early as 1954, the dominant Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) officially pronounced its obligation to the nation over its duty to support class struggle.12 As nationalists, Mexico's labor leaders share a deeply ingrained anti-gringoism, particularly the older cadre of labor leaders. They have experienced the humiliation of U.S. imperialistic muscle flexing. Gringos are not to be trusted. Hence, collaboration with Gringos does not come easily.

Developmentalism also weaves its way into the analytical scenario. Like other Mexicanos, labor leaders strive to contri- bute to the nation's economic growth. Economic growth translates into the creation of jobs for Mexico's massive number of unem- ployed and underemployed workers. Mexican organized labor correctly predicts new and better jobs emanating from the NAFTA.

Hence, Mexican organized labor counts several splendid reasons to support the NAFTA and to refuse cooperation with U.S. unions bent on its destruction. Prudent self-interest in an authoritarian political system counsels the wisdom of supporting the government on important issues. Moreover, a history of binational interaction teaches that Gringos should not be trusted, no matter the color of their shirt collar. Finally, the NAFTA promises to create jobs for fellow Mexicanos, a desirable goal for Mexico's organized labor.

Unions and Social Action Groups Compared

Unlike binational environmental, human rights, and public health groups, therefore, significant tension, if not hostility, defines the relationship between U.S. and Mexican organized labor in the mid-1990s as the NAFTA continues to test the ambition to move to working class solidarity. The differences between labor and other social action groups' characteristics and agenda add another increment to the analysis.

On the one hand, social action groups tend to be analogous to labor unions in their concentration on socio-economic issues, but the two also diverge in significant ways. In the first instance, environmental groups and their brethren tend to be far more independent of government than traditional unions or sindicatos in the U.S. and Mexico. Consequently, they are less politically compromised and more free to act as their predilections and perceived interests guide them.

Furthermore, environmentalists and human rights activists wax passionate and ideologically committed to their respective causes, and they enjoy a following that facilitates mobilizing political support. Environmentalism, especially, defines the social message of the mid-1990s. To be sure, millions of dedica- ted trade unionists and sindicalistas continue their struggle for social justice, but their cause no longer catalyzes the political support of 50 years ago. However moral and right organized labor's call for social justice may be, its political resonance has waned; its potential for political mobilization diminished; its mass popularity declined.

Thirdly, environmentalists and human rights advocates tend to be more sophisticated, more highly educated, and more cosmo-politan then their counterparts in the movimiento sindical. In that sense, they move easily to international cooperation and alliances. Hence, the socio-cultural and political attitudes of the proponents of environmentalism and human rights prepare them better than trade unionists for international cooperation.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the perceived self-interests of Mexican and U.S. sindicalistas contribute mightily to divergence and mutual suspicion. As noted previously, the crux of the NAFTA for unionists and sindicalistas is the perception of a zero sum calculation of jobs lost in the U.S. and jobs gained in Mexico. For many environmentalists and human rights advocates (and business interests), on the other hand, the NAFTA provides the promise of allies gained and resources added to pursue their mutual self-interests in both countries.

In sum, the NAFTA divides U.S. and Mexican organized labor. Furthermore, the labor side agreement to the NAFTA does little to reconcile the alienated union movements. In truth, the theory and practice of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation appears to belie the promise of "labor cooperation," or at least labor cooperation interpreted as collaborative initiatives by the major federations in Mexico and the United States, the CTM and the AFL-CIO. Indeed, the NAALC may be working the opposite effect in the mid-1990s. The early skirmishes over the unioni- zation of several maquiladora plants in the Borderlands and a manufacturing plant near San Francisco exemplifies the influences at work dividing U.S. and Mexican labor and highlights several other points explicated in this paper.

THE NAALC AND THE NAFTA CONNECTION

Neither the theory nor practice of the NAALC promises to overcome the divisions between Mexican and U.S. organized labor.

Rather, an analysis of the text of the Agreement combined with a review of its initial practice suggests that the NAALC may well exacerbate hostility between the two movements.

Looking first to the origins and its major thematic principles, it is clear that the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation has virtually nothing to do with labor unions cooperating to do much of anything. Of 25 central foci set out in the accord under the rubrics "Objectives", "Obligations", and "Labor Principles", one of the "Objectives" alludes diffusely to the need to "pursue cooperative labor-related activities on the basis of mutual benefit."13

The lack of protocols designed to nurture international proletarian collaboration should come as little surprise, given the original impetus for the NAALC. In large part, the Agreement evolved from the politics of the U.S. presidential campaign of 1992. Candidate Bill Clinton charged incumbent George Bush with failing to protect jobs (and the environment) in the original NAFTA accord. Clinton promised, if elected, to negotiate side agreements to remedy those flaws. Along with other promises, the pledge assured U.S. labor's support in the election, contributing to Clinton's electoral victory. In turn, U.S. organized labor called in its political chips by demanding the protection of labor rights in the side accord.

A major goal of the resultant NAALC reflected the funda- mentals of a long tradition of United State unionism; it sought to protect American jobs. Following the strategy inaugurated as early as the Caribbean Basin Initiative of 1983, the NAALC included worker rights provisions designed to encourage better working conditions, child labor protection, the right of free association, etc. in Mexico.14

Those worker rights define goals in themselves, of course, but to the point of this analysis, they also pursue a tactic designed to preserve American jobs. Their long range goal seeks to equalize wages and working conditions in foreign countries, thereby making U.S. workers more competitive with their foreign counterparts. To reiterate, the major purpose of the Agreement does not pertain, even indirectly, to labor union cooperation.

On the contrary, the NAALC is state centered. It concen- trates on the governmental policies and programs of the three sovereign signatories, not on the activities of unions, labor rights groups, or any other non-governmental organizations. In the process of pursuing a complaint about the freedom of associ- ation, for example, the original "plaintiff" may be union or sindicato, but its standing formally disappears if the issue gets adopted by its government and is pursued within the context of the Agreement. After the initial petition, the actors become governmental officials, not unionists or sindicalistas.15

In sum, the original impetus for the NAALC, the more proximate purpose for its drafting, and the document, itself, are not concerned with binational labor union cooperation. Whatever "labor cooperation" in the title may mean, it certainly does not specifically encourage organized labor in the U.S. and Mexico to band together to increase their influence and/or to serve their constituents.

Furthermore, the initial practice of the Agreement offers no reason to believe that the NAALC will encourage binational labor union cooperation, certainly not between the CTM and the AFL/CIO, the labor peak organizations in the two countries.16 As of early 1996, three petitions and all three cases have been decided in the United States. (Another petition was withdrawn.) One case has been decided in Mexico. All of the U.S. complaints revolved about collaborative attempts by U.S. and Mexican unions to organ- ize maquiladoras in the Borderlands. Two of the three U.S. cases evolved from disputes in the state of Chihuahua; the other from the Mexican state of Tamaulipas. The Mexican case deals with a complaint against Sprint for firing U.S. workers in a plant near San Francisco.

The Chihuahuan disputes took place in Ciudad Juárez and Ciudad Chihuahua. They contributed to three petitions brought to the U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO) for the NAALC. The NAOs from each of the three signatories to the NAALC are the first agencies to receive and adjudicate petitions brought under the Agreement. The NAO's also perform other functions not germane to this discussion.

After having unsuccessfully solicited the cooperation of Mexico's dominant CTM, in 1994 the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE) and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) recruited Mexico's small Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT) to launch efforts to organize two maquiladora plants, owned by General Electric and Honeywell.17 The organi-zing efforts failed, and the UE and IBT appealed the cases to the U.S. NAO on grounds that the Mexican government frustrated the organizing efforts because it did not correctly apply its own labor code. The U.S. NAO denied two of the three petitions; the third was withdrawn. Significantly, Mexico's CTM and other important Mexican unions guarded their silence throughout the entire process. They did not support the FAT. Likewise, the AFL-CIO took no active role in the process.

The final case brought to the U.S. NAO ended in qualified success for the Mexican and U.S. petitioners. It dealt with workers in a Japanese-owned Sony maquiladora in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas. The Mexican workers attempted to replace their CTM union, but were denied an election by the government-dominated Conciliation and Arbitration Board (CAB). In this case, four U.S. and Mexican human/worker rights groups filed a petition with the U.S. NAO: the International Labor Rights Fund, the American Friends Service Committee, the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras and the Asociación de Abogados Democráticos (National Association of Democratic Lawyers).

The U.S. NAO found the Mexican CAB in violation of Mexican laws and called for Ministerial level consultations between Mexico and the United States, in accordance with the NAALC. The Ministerial Consultations, in turn, specified a series of remedial measures, including three seminars to educate interested parties on union registration procedures. In this case, the CTM actively opposed the binational petitioners, at least at the initial stage of the complaint.

After the U.S. NAO had held against the Mexican government, the Sindicato de Telefonistas de la República Mexicana (STRM) and the U.S. Communications Workers of America (CWA) brought a case to the Mexican NAO. It charged the lack of a prompt remedy in U.S. labor law and practice for Sprint's subsidiary's firing of 177 (mostly Latino) workers in San Francisco. The U.S. National Labor Relations Board found that Sprint committed more than 50 violations of the law.18 The Mexican NAO found for the petitioners, and recommeded the case to the ministerial level. In late 1995 the Mexican and U.S. Ministers of Labor ordered hearings and analyses of the implications of the rapid closing of plants.

The initial round of cases under the NAALC imply signifi- cance for an analysis of labor union internationalism. They confirm that the most important labor organization in Mexico and the U.S. remain uncommitted to binational cooperative efforts. The Mexican CTM continues to withhold its cooperation from its U.S. counterparts, and the AFL-CIO is lukewarm about lending its support to binational organizing efforts.

On the Mexican side, the CTM eschewed participation across the board. Indeed, the local CTM affiliate in league with the local authorities in Nuevo Laredo in the Sony case actively opposed the binational organizing effort. On the Mexican side, the FAT has been the most significant participant in the binational efforts. The telefonistas (STRM), Democratic Lawyers Association, and Mexican members of the AFSC and CJM have played less important roles.

None of those organizations represent the CTM, the most significant of organized labor's peak organizations in Mexico.

The FAT is small, fairly radical, independent, and as much social movement as sindicato. The telefonistas and their leader, Francisco Hernández Juárez, nurture a well-earned reputation for progressive unionism and maintain something close to a hostile relationship with the CTM. Hernández Juárez is often mentioned as the next líder maximo of Mexican organized labor, replacing the long lived Fidel Velázquez, who will be 96 years old in 1996. The telefonistas do affiliate with the Congreso del Trabajo (CT), a loosely knit national labor confederation. The Democratic Lawyers have no connection to the CTM.

The line-up on the U.S. side tends to be more complex, but the essential conclusion much the same. The AFL-CIO remains aloof from the binational organizing effort. Beyond that point, the motives of the U.S. partners shade from international solidarity to calculating self-interest.

Human rights/labor rights/social action groups and unions made up the United States participants in the initial round of cases under the NAALC. Groups like the AFSC and the CJM maintain an ambivalent relationship with the AFL-CIO. The UE is not affiliated with the AFL-CIO and, according to Barry Carr, "the influence of the old Communist party culture still exercises some influence" within the union.19 The Teamsters maintain a tension-filled relationship with the AFL-CIO and often see themselves as a alternative rather than an affiliate. Like the Mexican telefonistas, finally, the U.S. Communications Workers cultivate a progressive internationalist agenda and find it easy to maintain cordial relations with the progressive leader of the telephone workers' sindicato, Hernández Juárez.

The point is clear enough. The exceptions prove the rule. While the CTM and the AFL-CIO disdain binational cooperation, the several groups that pursue the strategy are either non-union social action groups or, if unions, are small, radical, consciously progressive, or competitive with the peak organi- zations, the CTM and the AFL-CIO.

To carry the argument one step further, the positions assumed by the AFL-CIO and the CTM may well stem from a perfectly rational analysis of their self-interest. On the side of the AFL-CIO, the explanation is straight forward. Its leadership has been side-stepped by the CTM so frequently that it has about given up all attempts to nurture genuine cooperation.

The explanation of the CTM's position is rather more complicated, but certainly not irrational. The AFL-CIO's support of the FAT subverts the hegemony of the CTM and other official and semi-official unions in Mexico. It is unreasonable to expect the CTM to cooperate with a group apparently bent upon weakening its position.

Mexican organized labor also may question the motives of its U.S. counterpart as U.S. unions pursue the organization of U.S.-owned industry located in Mexico. That is, U.S. labor's strategy of organizing in Mexico may well be advantageous for Mexican workers, but it is also designed to narrow the wage differential between the two countries. Thus, it reduces the incentive for U.S. businesses to move south in search of lower labor costs. In the process, the strategy preserves jobs in the United States, always a primary objective for the U.S. labor movement long steeped in protectionist principles. A recent study crystallizes the point:

John Hovis, president of the United Electrical Workers union, said he plans to build strong, independent Mexican unions by defending workers whose rights have been violated by U.S. firms operating in Mexico. "Strong Mexican unions stop job flight," Hovis said.20

CONCLUSIONS

While the North American Free Trade Agreement contributes to flourishing interaction between numerous groups in Mexico and the United States, it has done precious little to nurture cooperation between the CTM and the AFL-CIO. Moreover, the special side agreement accord pertaining to labor in the NAFTA countries has made no significant contribution to labor union solidarity. If anything, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation may complicate the relationship as it provides a forum that highlights differences between the Mexican CTM and the U.S. AFL-CIO.

The unsuccessful outcome of initiatives to further international working class cooperation in the context of the NAFTA flows all-to-clearly from the history, the ideological persuasion, and the contemporary power position of organized labor in both the U.S. and Mexico. In both countries, organized labor is comparatively weak, more or less nationalistic, and relatively unschooled in the ways of proletarian internation- alism.

The NAFTA, furthermore, gets to both movements' fundamental interests in crystallizing the issue of jobs. In the U.S., the AFL-CIO intransigently opposed the trade agreement because it implied the loss of jobs--and, of course, the potential erosion of union membership. In Mexico, the CTM and other sindical organizations followed the lead of the government and their own self interest in supporting the NAFTA because it implied an increase in Mexican jobs--and, of course, a potential increase in union membership.

Moreover, the NAALC makes no contribution to the binational union cooperation. The document's origin evolved from a poli- tically-inspired effort to protect U.S. jobs. Its basic principles define a state-led process designed to reduce conflicts that threaten commerce.

As the initial practice of the NAALC has evolved, furthermore, it has threatened the power position of the CTM in Mexico. The CTM's enemies coalesce with U.S. groups to challenge a system of Mexican labor law and practice fashioned by the CTM and the government that guarantees the continued primacy of the CTM, the official labor federation. Agitation from the several U.S. groups adds to the insecurity of the CTM, further exacer- bating divisions long-existent between organized labor in the two countries.

Furthermore, the mixed motives of U.S. labor are questioned in Mexico. While the principles of working class solidarity may be served and the position of Mexican dissident labor strength- ened, the U.S. union movement is equally interested in decreasing wage disparities to reduce the incentive for U.S. companies to relocate in Mexico. The issue of jobs, to reiterate, stands at the core of the tension-filled relationship.

In the future, the jobs equation is not liable to change dramatically, but three other factors may influence the relationship between the two movements: the increasing influence of binational social action groups in the relationship; an evolving sense of community encompassing U.S. and Mexican workers; and a change of leadership and policies emanating from the top of the two union movements.

The growing influence of binational social action groups tends toward what Barry Carr calls "labor internationalism" as distinct from "trade union internationalism."21 The discussion of "binational cooperative initiatives" presented in this paper gets to some of the considerations of that calculation.

A sense of evolving community is also struck in that same discussion. Most of the examples emanate from Borderlands groups where the participants enjoy ongoing physical and social interaction with one another, thereby bonding in a genuine feeling of solidarity. A variation on that theme comes out of binational cooperative initiatives launched by auto workers and farm workers in Mexico and the United States. In this variation, similar vocational and job site experiences substitute for the physical proximity of the Borderlands bonds.

Finally and most obviously, a change in national union leadership may nudge the respective movements toward increased collaboration. In the United States, John J. Sweeney assumed the presidency of the AFL-CIO in the Fall of 1995. His platform hinted at a change in international policy, but no significant new directions are yet forthcoming.22 In Mexico, Fidel Velásquez continues to hold forth. He promises to step aside, but the move is uncertain. This is not the place to offer an extensive analysis of the succession to Fidel, but more sympathy toward binational cooperation with the U.S. would certainly be forthcoming if Hernández Juárez emerges as the leader of Mexican organized labor.

ENDNOTES

1. For the data, see Lisa Genasci, "Tired Workers Revolt Against Forced Overtime," Arizona Daily Star (Tucson), September, 30, 1994, p.B3; and Bob Herbert, "Workers, Unite!", New York Times September 14, 1994, p.A15; and "Where Have the Good Jobs Gone?", from the July 3, 1995 edition of U.S. News and World Report, reprinted in Hunger Awareness Resource Center, Tucson AZ, Fall, 1995.

2.For the data and concomitant commentary, see Lucy Conger, "Workers fear modernization," Financial Times October 12, 1989, Information Services on Latin America (ISLA) 1356; Anthony de Palma, "Mexico's Pack for Stability in Economy," New York Times, September 27, 1994, p. C1; "Economists Scoff at Government Inflation Figures: Working Class Hit Hardest", Mexico Update, April, 1990, p.3; "Mexico: Economic Indicators" Mexico Business Monthly, Nov, 1993, p.22; "New Phase of the Pact...", Mexico Update, June 1, 1990, p. 2; Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico, May 1990,. p. 236; Jennifer Tierney, "New Wage, Price Pack Signed," El Financiero Internacional, Oct 3-9, 1994, p.3.

3.For the data and concomitant commentary, see Author's personal interview with a Cananea worker-activist, Tucson, August 7, 1990; "Cananea segurirá funcionando," El Mañana (Nuevo Laredo), 23 de Agosto de 1989, p.1; Adrian Lajous, "Teléfonos de México," El Informador (Guadalajara), 11 de Julio de 1989, p. A4; "Mex-

ico Sells Off State Companies..., New York Times, October 27, 1993, p. A1; "More Parastates on the Block," Mexico Update June 10, 1990; Review of the Economic Situation in Mexico, Aug 1994, p. 360; and "Rural Alert," Latin American Weekly Report, July 21, 1994, p. 316.

4. See James Pick and Stephenson-Glade, " The NAFTA Agreement and Labor Projections: Implications for the Border Region," Journal of Borderlands Studies, IX, No. 1, Spring, 1994, pp. 82,87.

5. See "Case Histories in Success: Joint Ventures in Mexico," Mexico City: Mexican Investment Board, n.d., 1994), 44pp; and Edward J. Williams "El TLC and La Oposición," El Independiente (Hermosillo), 27 de Mayo de 1994, p.D4.

6. The following discussion leans heavily upon a series of articles in BorderLines out of Albuquerque's Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center. See, especially, I: 2 3; and II:1,2,3.

7. See, for example, Sealing Our Borders: The Human Toll. Third Report of the ILEMP. (Philadelphia, PA: American Friends Service Committee, 1992).

8.For the analysis, see Jefferson Cowie, "U.S. Labor and NAFTA: Reflections on the Past and Future of Economic Integration". Latin American Labor News, Issue 8, 1993, pp. 1ff.

9. Raúl Trejo Delarbre, "El NAFTA en Mexico: La renovación sindical no llegará de fuera," Latin American Labor News, Issue 9, 1993-94, p. 2.

10. See Kevin J. Middlebrook, "The Sounds of Silence: Organized Labor's Response to Economic Crisis in Mexico," Journal of Latin American Studies XXI, Part 2, 1989, p.201.

11. See Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) p. 112.

12. See John Morris Ryan, et al., Area Handbook for Mexico (Washington: Superintendent of Documents, 1970), p.365.

13. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (Washington: National Administrative Office, 1993) pp.3-5,33-34.

14. See Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response (Ascencio Report) (Washington: The Committee for the Study..., July 1990), 73-74.

15. For the analysis, see Stephen Mumme and Dimitris Stevis, "NAFTA and International Social Policy", unpublished paper (Fort Collins: Colorado State University, 1995), pp.35-36.

16. For the discussion of the several cases see, International Labor Rights Fund, "Mexican Authorities Betray Sony Workers Again" News from ILRF, August 1, 1995; "Reich and Onate Sign Agreement on Sony Case," Borderlines, III, No.7, July, 1995, p.7; U.S. Department of Labor, Foreign Labor Trends: Mexico, 1994-1995. (Mexico City: U.S. Embassy, 1995); and a file on Submissions to the NAO 940003 and 94004 supplied to the author by the NAO.

17. The official, U.S. government report is U.S. National Administrative Office, North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Public Report of Review. NAO Submission #940001 and NAO Submission #940002, (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, October 12, 1994). For some elements of the discussion, see Allen R Myerson, "Big Labor's Strategic Raid in Mexico," and "Reich Supports Mexico on Union Organizing," New York Times Sept 12 and Oct 13, 1994; pp.C1,C7, respectively; and "Unions Pressure U.S. on NAFTA Labor," El Financiero Internacional, Sept.19-25, 1994, p.3.

18. "First NAFTA Labor Rights Complaint in Mexico," Borderlines III, No.3, March, 1995, p.6.

19. Carr, "Labor Internationalism in the Era of NAFTA: Past and Present." A paper written for a conference on "Labor, Free Trade, and Economic Integration...". Duke University, 1994 p.17.

20. Quoted in Carr, "Labor Internationalism...", p.30. Of course, the ambition to nurture "strong, independent" sindicatos should not be despised, whatever the motivation. Along with other positive developments encouraged, that fact implies that the NAALC probably has some redeeming qualities. But, those positive characteristics of the Agreement remain beside the point of this analysis.

21. See, Carr, "Labor Internationalism...", p.4.

22. See Steven Greenhouse, "A Big Job for Labor," New York Times, West Coast edition, September 27, 1995,p. A12; and Larry Weiss, "Sweeney Victory May Mean New International Policy," Working Together (Minneapolis, MN: Resource Center of the Americas), September-October, 1995, p.3.