More than ever before, developing countries are participating in and influencing international trade negotiations. GATT membership now includes 98 developing countries or economies in transition out of a total membership of 124. In 1948, the original 23 GATT contracting parties included only 11 developing countries. Furthermore, in the Uruguay Round (UR) of the GATT negotiations, which began in 1986, developing countries were able to work for the first time as a bloc.
Experts agree that developing countries have much at stake with the new UR agreement. Six studies have estimated the effects of the trade agreement worldwide, as well as on developed and developing countries. The estimates of worldwide income gain after implementation of the agreement range from $140 billion to $274.1 billion annually. Developing countries, in general, are expected to increase incomes from $36 billion to $89.1 billion annually, according to these studies.
While, in aggregate, the trade agreement is expected to benefit most countries, distribution will be uneven. Some regions, countries, or sectors within countries may lose, in the short run at least. Many trade analysts concur that those most likely to be negatively affected include: the poorest countries, net food importers, producers of coffee, cocoa, tea and rice, and countries that have previously benefited from preferential treatment. Sub-Saharan African countries are typically in these categories. At the same time, experts predict that the developing countries in Asia are going to be the greatest beneficiaries of trade reform among developing countries, with those in Latin America second.
Several issues in the agreement are of primary importance for developing countries. The World Trade Organization (WTO) will replace GATT as the mechanism to enforce the rules and settle disputes. Unlike in the past, countries must agree to virtually all the provisions of the agreement in order to be a member of the WTO. Agriculture, for the first time, will follow uniform trade rules under the WTO. The general reduction in agricultural subsidies is expected to improve market access and developing country competitiveness in a sector of importance to most developing countries. Another benefit to many developing countries from the UR agreement is the phase out of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). Textile exporters, often developing countries, no longer will be subject to the discriminatory use of quotas that had been permitted by the MFA. Despite the many gains from the new trade rules, however, developing countries have some concerns: loss of market access due to erosion of preferential treatment, possible increase in food prices, loss of protection for domestic producers and consumers, and possible loss in value of certain exports.
The total impact from the UR agreement on developing countries will be evaluated throughout the next decade, and beyond, as it is implemented. Whether the UR agreement will affect US foreign aid, foreign investment or foreign policy may be a topic of hearings and debate in the years ahead.
On December 8, 1994, President Clinton signed the Uruguay Round implementing legislation (P.L. 103-465), putting the provisions of the Uruguay Round trade agreement into law for the United States. Developed and developing countries alike will be greatly affected by implementation of the agreement. Some claim that it represents the most sweeping changes in world trade rules in 40 years.
How developing countries fare under the trade agreement is of some consequence to US foreign policy interests, how the United States implements its foreign aid program and longer term US trade and investment prospects. Developing countries are the fastest growing markets for US exports, and therefore, are gaining in economic importance. If developing countries expand their ability to trade and increase foreign exchange earnings as a result of the agreement, fewer demands for US foreign assistance could result. In addition, US trade and investment activities could be focused more in those developing country economies with upward trends. If, on the other hand, some developing countries are hurt by the new agreement, US foreign assistance and multilateral development aid may need to adjust their strategies to meet future needs. During the GATT negotiations, developing countries increased their political strength by operating as a uniform block of nations. This, coupled with their resources of certain strategic materials, for example, may be a factor in US foreign policy decision-making.
Included among the trade reforms are reductions in tariffs, an action that will likely result in greater market access for most exporting countries. Specifically, an expected increase in agriculture and textile market access could be of particular benefit to many developing countries. Rules for safeguards, antidumping, and subsidies are generally strengthened by the Uruguay Round (UR) agreement. Also, an end to voluntary export restraints (VERs), tightened rules for defining dumping, as well as a sunset provision for antidumping duties may reduce market uncertainty for developed and developing countries. A requirement to become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is intended to prevent countries from being free riders, benefiting without making the commitment to abide by the rules. Each developed and developing WTO member country will have equal voting power in enforcing the agreement.
Recently, a number of economists, development experts and journalists
have assessed the UR agreement affects on developing countries. There seems
to be consensus among economists that most developing countries will be
better off with the agreement than without it. Without the accord, these
countries would fare far worse with the status quo, or under a more likely
scenario of a trade war, experts believe.1
However, some journalists and humanitarian interest groups argue that the
poorest countries (particularly in Africa) may be negatively affected,
at least in the short run, by the new trade rules.This report presents
the range of estimates, derived from the available studies, of world and
developing country income gains or losses after implementation of the UR
agreement.2 Included is a discussion
on specific aspects of the UR agreement relevant to developing countries,
as well as some of their concerns. Whether the UR agreement will affect
US foreign aid, foreign investment or foreign policy may be a topic of
hearings and debate in the years ahead.
Several rounds of negotiations of trade rules have occurred throughout the history of GATT. The Uruguay Round, which began in 1986, is the eighth. On April 16,1994, officials from more than 100 countries gathered in Marrakech, Morocco to sign the UR agreement, also referred to as the Final Act. As of December 31, 1994, 80 countries have accepted the WTO agreement.
a The total for developing countries is calculated as a residual after subtracting the developed country total gain from the world total gain.
b ODI presents a low estimate for developing countries of 1% and a high estimate of 6%
The studies also agree that world income gains or losses will determine how specific countries and exporters of specific products will do. Some analysts believe that as world income rises, so will demand for almost all products, and export earnings for virtually all countries will increase. Most economists believe that net food importers could suffer a loss (at least in the short run), although a few claim that even those countries could benefit. One study concludes that countries that export coffee, cocoa, tea and rice are least likely to increase exports, as prices for these products are expected to decline and demand is not likely to increase significantly.3
Although useful for assessing how the GATT accord will affect the developing world, these studies have a number of limitations. For example, the quantitative studies lump developing countries together as one block. Development experts assert, however, that developing countries cannot be viewed as one single, homogeneous trading block. Each came to the negotiating table with its own problems and goals.4 These studies conclude that developing countries in aggregate will benefit from the agreement, but they acknowledge that the distribution of benefits will be uneven. Furthermore, some countries may gain, even though some of their population (usually the rural segment) may lose due to uneven distribution of income gains or imported food; in some cases, though, the urban population may lose if food prices rise dramatically.
An Agency for International Development (AID) report5 raises several concerns about quantitative assessments of developing country benefits from the UR agreement. First, some studies derive an estimate as the residual of the world minus industrial country gains, providing possibly misleading and overly optimistic estimates for developing countries. Second, while most studies conclude that developing countries generally will gain, they do not take into account the lack of resilience and leverage individual countries have in exerting influence on world supply, demand or price. Third, revenue gains for developing countries have not included the additional technical and financial resources that would be needed for a robust and rapid supply response to price or demand changes in the world. Many of the world's developing countries earn foreign exchange via exports of tree crops, the supply of which cannot be increased significantly in the short run. Furthermore, these studies have not considered the lack of infrastructure, agribusiness equipment, land restrictions or climate. And, finally, economic methods used to estimate income gains or losses from the UR agreement have been derived from known responses of first world economies, not third world ones.
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) report6 states that there are many problems with the quantitative assessments of the UR agreement which tend to understate the world and developing country gains from the agreement. First, precisely quantifying the benefits from changes in nontariff barriers (NTBs) is impossible; second, most of the studies have primarily an agricultural focus, thereby underestimating trade liberalization in the manufacturing and services sectors; third, the general equilibrium model assumed perfect competition in product markets, thereby excluding gains from trade due to economies of scale with imperfect competition; and fourth, the studies compared real income gains with the status quo, rather than with increased protectionism that many experts believe likely would occur without an agreement. Thus, the IMF conclusion is that the real income estimates of the UR studies are underestimated.A Brookings occasional paper acknowledges that estimates of world gain resulting from trade reform may be inaccurate, but suggests that even if the income gain resulting from the UR agreement is closer to its low-end estimate of $140 billion, that is still significant.
RESULTS OF THE AGREEMENT AND ISSUES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES7
With a greater level of participation by developing countries than ever before in GATT negotiations, these countries were able to attain a number of trade changes that will benefit them. Increased market access, including agriculture, improved textile trade rules, membership and voting power in the new World Trade Organization, and strengthening of other trade rules are expected to help developing countries. Agriculture and textile reforms are potentially the most beneficial for developing countries. At the same time, some developing country governments have concerns about a possible gap in food availability and their food import needs, a weakening of preferential treatment, loss of domestic industry protection, and increased accountability for WTO membership.
TARIFF REDUCTION AND MARKET ACCESS
The agreement will reduce tariffs by an average of 38 percent on traded industrial products, with some tariffs being eliminated and some being reduced more than 50 percent. Tariff reductions will be in place after five years, with some product exceptions allowing for 10 year phase-in of tariff reductions. The UR agreement is the first to include significant agriculture and textile reform. Agricultural and textile tariffication (converting all NTBs to tariff equivalents) and tariff reduction may be among the most significant changes in world trade rules for developing countries.
Reducing tariffs could be a double-edged sword for developing countries. Lower worldwide tariffs generally will increase market access for their products, increase their potential to market their exports, and increase their foreign exchange earnings. Lowering their own barriers will likely mean an increase in consumer products at lower costs, as well. The negative side of reducing tariffs for many developing countries is that, particularly in Africa, developing countries have the highest tariff and nontariff barriers in the world.8 Reduction will mean less protection for domestic industries and could mean a significant loss of government tariff revenue in these countries.
A concern on the part of many countries (primarily ACP countries--African, Caribbean and Pacific9 ) that have been recipients of preferential treatment (i.e., Generalized System of Preferences--GSP--by the United States and the Lome Convention by the European Union--EU) is that their preferential treatment in the form of lower or zero tariffs on certain products to certain markets will be diluted by significantly reducing tariffs to all under the UR agreement. Losses in ACP volume of exports to the EU market because of erosion of Lome benefits translates to increasing competition for African exporters with Latin American and Asian exporters of tropical products to the EU.10
In contrast, the GATT Director-General disagrees with the concern that the erosion of preferential treatment will be devastating for ACP countries. The objective of GSP is not to divert trade from other exporters, but rather to provide the possibility for developing countries to compete on an equal footing with producers of industrial goods in developed importing countries. According to the GATT Director-General, this same objective can be effectively met through the elimination of tariffs negotiated in a multilateral trade agreement. He believes developing countries can compete with confidence about the future conditions of market access, rather than being affected by political philosophy or being conditional or temporary.11
Some concern is currently being expressed by trade analysts as some countries appear to be binding their tariffs (including their tariffied NTBs) to levels that are suspected to be higher than they should be. Reducing them by the amount required by the agreement then places the protection higher (some reportedly are believed to be as much as 200 percent to 300 percent higher) than they were before the trade agreement. This practice is referred to as "dirty tariffication''. Countries accused of doing this include the EU, the United States, Canada, Pakistan, Morocco, and Turkey, among others.12 Developing countries, especially, could lose much-needed benefits of market access (such as increased foreign exchange earnings from trade) if this practice becomes widespread.
AGRICULTURE13
For the first time, the Uruguay Round Agreement will require agriculture to follow uniform world trade rules under GATT. Developed country agricultural tariffs (as well as converted NTBs) will be reduced by 36 percent, while those of developing countries will be reduced by 24 percent, using a 1986-1988 base. Each tariff item in developed countries must be cut by a minimum of 15 percent, and by at least 10 percent in developing countries. Internal agricultural support programs that distort trade will be cut by 20 percent, and export subsidy programs must be reduced by 36 percent in developed countries (over 6 years) and 21 percent in developing countries (over 10 years). Least developed countries are completely exempt from these agricultural reforms.
Developing countries have several concerns about the agriculture measures of the IJR agreement.
1) Loss of market access due to preferential treatment. Preferential treatment has provided ACP countries with an advantage over other exporters by lowering or eliminating tariffs on some products into certain markets. ACP countries fear lowering tariffs worldwide to all exporters will dilute the advantage they previously maintained, thereby losing the marketing edge they have held in tropical products exports, particularly in Europe. It is possible that trade reform will help Latin American and Asian exporting countries to gain market access over the ACP countries in the near term. ACP losses in volume cannot significant barriers to tropical goods that will decline because of trade reform are in the EU market.
2) Possible increase in food prices. Net food importing countries may find it increasingly difficult to pay for needed food imports as the UR agreement is expected to restrict world food supply. As food exporters are required to reduce internal supports and export subsidies, world food supplies are expected to decline initially. That, it is anticipated, will result in a rise in world food prices in the short run. Those countries that depend heavily on imported food or foreign food aid may have to use more of their scarce foreign exchange to purchase their current food import needs.
3) Loss of protection for domestic producers and consumers. In many developing countries, consumers have received subsidies while producers have been taxed. Some countries further have imposed high tariffs or NTBs to restrict imports and protect domestic producers. The agreement will reverse these policies, allowing producers to react to market forces. In the long run most development experts believe this will result in greater food security for developing countries. Nevertheless one developing country governments are concerned about the transition period.
4) Loss in export value. Countries that export coffee, cocoa, tea and rice could lose as the prices of their products are expected, by at least one study, to decline without a corresponding increase in demand. Many countries exporting these products are also net food importers. Being a least developed country and exempt from agricultural reforms may not help these countries. Goldin, Knudsen and Mensbrugghe believe that the major producers of these crops tend to tax the production of them. They argue that as prices for these commodities rise, domestic consumption declines. As producers increase exports, world price declines and receipts to these countries fall. Unfortunately, the exporters of these goods are often net food importers who will be faced with a price rise in staple foods such as grains and vegetable oils.
Many development experts and agricultural economists believe that if developing countries liberalize their own agricultural trade barriers, create an atmosphere that promotes foreign investment, and encourage labor to move out of unprofitable sectors into more profitable ones, developing countries would likely increase their own agricultural exports, increase foreign exchange earnings, and increase import purchases in the long run. Experts say that if world income rises, as it is expected to, demand will grow for virtually all exports, with developing countries being able to realize gains with increased demand from income effects. Moreover, some agricultural economists assert that world food price increases will encourage developing countries to boost their own food production, both to save on their food import expenditures and to increase foreign exchange earnings.
According to an AID study, "this will be good for domestic consumer, producer and country, if domestically produced food is nutritional and accessible to all at the same or lower costs as imports." There is a concern, however, that domestically-produced food will not be of adequate nutritional value and that the most rural populations in some developing countries will suffer from rising food prices and unequal distribution of food or income as a result of trade reform. The AID study goes on to criticize the theory that higher world food prices will benefit developing countries, saying that net food importers could be hurt, possibly in the long run, if they cannot develop increased food production capability. Those who believe that developing countries can gain from the UR by increasing their own export sales of agricultural commodities assume that these countries have additional technical and financial resources, as well as infrastructure, productive land, adequate climate for rapidly increasing food output. In many cases the exports of these countries are tree crops which would take a number of years to expand.14
FOOD AID
The UR agreement specifically exempts food aid programs from required reforms. Bona fide food assistance, such as the U.S. P.L. 480’s Titles I, II and III, as well as U.S. export credit guarantee programs are allowed to continue. The agreement also prohibits countries from circumventing required export subsidy reductions by moving commodities into food aid programs.
While bona fide food aid programs have not been directly challenged by the UR agreement, they will likely be affected if agricultural commodity supplies decrease and prices increase as a result of the agreement. Less purchasing power on the part of donor countries to buy and ship an adequate tonnage of food aid commodities could result in shortages to meet world food aid needs. Adding to the problem are increasing budget strains most food aid donor countries are experiencing, causing many developing countries to be worried about the future of food aid in the short run and possibly in the long run. Concerns prompted the food importing group of GATT participating in the Uruguay Round to add to the agreement ministerial declarations that specifically address these issues of net food importing countries, including a possible transition period for food prices and special cooperation with the international financial institutions.
Another view of food aid, however, is that developing countries have been hindered for years by the large-scale use of foreign food aid, allowing these governments to continue domestic policies such as consumer subsidies, and blocking needed market signals that would prompt developing country farmers to produce based on supply, demand and price. Some observers believe that limiting food aid only to emergencies (although the UR agreement does not do this) would improve food security in developing countries in the long run.
TEXTILES15
The textile sector trade liberalization under the UR agreement is of keen interest to many developing countries. The Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) has existed since 1974 and allows bilateral quotas to be established between textile exporting and importing countries, allowing for discrimination between them on a case-by-case basis. Under the agreement, the MFA will be phased out over ten years. MFA quotas have been applied mostly by developed countries against developing countries, although MFA has also allowed Pakistan and India to maintain high barriers. Thus, phasing it out and putting all textile exporters on equal terms favors developing countries, since they have inexpensive labor in this labor-intensive industry. Countries expected to gain the most from the textile provisions include China (not currently a GATT member), low-income countries in South Asia and the newly industrialized countries (NICs)--Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. China is expected to gain in the medium term, although U.S. quotas for China's textile imports are not expected to be lifted until China becomes a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Sub-Saharan African countries are not expected to gain significantly because they already had been receiving preferential treatment for their exports to Europe, their primary market. (Although Mauritius and Nigeria have been shown to have potential gain with elimination of the MFA.)16
A criticism of the UR agreement on textiles is that it is not until the seventh year that tariffs are reduced by 50 percent. The largest chunk of tariffs is not scheduled to be phased out until the tenth year. Furthermore, developed countries can offer the least domestically (politically or economically) sensitive quotas to lower tariffs in the early years, maintaining a continued higher level of protection for the last of the ten years.17
Prior to the U.S. congressional vote, consumer activist Ralph Nader
suggested that a few small countries could ban together to block policies
that large countries, such as the United States, would favor. Most experts,
however, do not list this as a major concern regarding the WTO.
Safeguards allow a country to temporarily protect a domestic industry from serious injury due to sudden increased import competition. Voluntary export restraints (VERs), not sanctioned by the GATT, are bilaterally-negotiated agreements to restrict exports. Because of the growing use and abuse of this trade policy tool, the UR agreement abolished VERs. The agreement also changed the rules for use of antidumping measures and established a sunset provision to limit their duration. Tightening and clarifying trade rules and safeguards provides greater worldwide market stability and less uncertainty for developing country exporters.
The UR agreement, for the first time, defined subsidies as permitted subsidies, prohibited subsidies and an intermediate category--those that could lead to countervailing duties. Improved definition in these areas is expected to lead to a reduction in the use of countervailing duties. One area of concern among developing countries is that the new rules could result in an increase in government subsidies for research and development of high-tech products that they believe would continue a trade bias against poorer, developing countries.
Sanitary and phytosanitary (S&P) measures in the UR agreement require that scientific evidence be the basis for their use to restrict trade. The agreement allows use of the principle of equivalence--accepting standards that provide equal risk or protection, but may not be identical. Developing countries are concerned that S&P codes may require substantial investment in technology for some countries to comply to the new S&P codes. At the same time, some developing countries have applied S&P measures to protect their own domestic agricultural-related industries, encouraging inefficiencies. By removing unscientific S&P barriers, experts believe some developing countries will have access to an increased quality and quantity of food imports.19
Trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and services were new issues negotiated in the UR Agreement. The agreement establishes rules for trade-distorting investment measures and includes a list of prohibited activities such as local content and trade balancing requirements. Developed countries are to eliminate prohibited activities in two years, developing countries in five years and least developing countries in seven years. Some development experts claim that the new rules on investment will reduce the bargaining power of developing countries with large multinational corporations. However, the new rules also might make investment in developing countries more attractive if the rules make investment more secure.
TRIPs provides rules to fight international trade in counterfeit goods.
It sets binding standards for protection of copyrights, trademarks, patents
and trade secrets. In the long run, developing countries may realize greater
access to foreign technology as intellectual property is increasingly protected.
However, in the short run and in some cases, the cost to the developing
country of imported protected products may increase at the same time that
the country may be losing a "pirate industry". Among the most often accused
countries for TRIPs violations are China, South Korea, Brazil, Singapore,
Taiwan and Thailand.
China and India account for 40 percent of the world's population. Thus, how these two economies fare after trade reform is of interest to the rest of the world. Goldin, Knudsen, and Mensbrugghe estimate that China's income will increase by 2.5 percent after implementation of the UR agreement, while they estimate India's will increase by 0.5 percent.
In China, the gains will be observed more in the rural sector than the urban. With the exception of rice, most food prices are expected to rise as the cost of manufactured goods are expected to decline. Goldin, Knudsen and Mensbrugghe expect the world price of rice to decline due to the reduction of domestic taxation of production. At the same time, according to the study, consumer demand will decline because consumer subsidies will be reduced. Consumers likely will substitute other foods, such as animal and wheat products, which are not protected in China and are typically in greater demand as incomes rise.
How China fares after trade reform will remain uncertain until GATT members decide under what conditions China will be allowed to be a member of WTO. The United States and other members are currently negotiating terms of China's accession to WTO. China is insisting that it become a founding member primarily for the political status it would afford. (China was a founding member of the GATT, but ended its GATT membership after communist forces took control.) The United States opposes China's immediate membership until Beijing has instituted further economic reforms.
A second issue is whether China will be classified as a developing country, a position favored by China, but not by the United States. Such status would allow Beijing to have a longer implementation period for most of the UR agreement reforms. It would also allow the Chinese government to continue subsidizing export industries without legal recourse. Additionally, the United States is linking China's WTO membership with Chinese action or inaction on improving its trade integrity and cooperation on the issue of protection of intellectual property rights.
India, which at first opposed large scale trade reforms (because of
its high levels of protection), became a very active participant in the
UR negotiations. (India realized that to avoid being shut out of international
trade reform benefits altogether, it had to join the negotiations.) Nevertheless,
many in India viewed the government's eventual cooperation as having sold
out its own people, as it appeared to them that India was offering too
many concessions. While India had already begun unilateral trade reform
in 1991, cutting tariffs from the previous average of 125 percent to the
current level of 70 percent, experts contend that it will have much further
to go to meet GATT agreement requirements. Economists believe that India
will gain significantly from the phasing out of the MFA and reform of agricultural
trade rules.
Another concern on the part of ACP tropical products exporters is that with the reduction in tariffs, the preferential treatment they have received (largely exports of tropical products to Europe) will be diminished. Some believe that selected Latin American countries will increase the competition in European and U.S. markets for these products--a negative for ACP countries.
Northern African countries and South Africa have a greater potential to increase their income as a result of implementing and participating in the UR agreement and WTO. For the most part, sub-Saharan African countries were not actively involved in the GATT negotiations and are expected to be most negatively affected by them.
The agreement excludes least developed countries from many of its most stringent rules and allows for longer time periods to phase in most of the changes. Goldin, Knudsen and Mensbrugghe concluded that most African countries' incomes would decline after trade reform, but are optimistic that in the long run these countries could benefit if they made the required adjustments to liberalize their own trade rules. Goldin, Knudsen and Mensbrugghe estimate that trade reform similar to that of the UR agreement would result in an income loss for Nigeria of 0.4 percent and 0.2 percent for the rest of Africa, excluding South Africa, by the year 2002. This study estimates that South Africa will experience an increase in income of 0.6 percent by 2002.
According to Yeats, the erosion of Lome and GSP will result in an income loss estimated to be $4.2 billion for 29 sub-Saharan African countries. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe account for 85 percent of the $4.2 billion loss. Mauritius is expected to gain because of the textile agreement. Yeats predicts that sub-Saharan Africa will lose more exports through the erosion of preferential treatment than it will gain from trade liberalization.23
ODI asserts that ACP losses in export volume to the EU market because
of dilution of preferential treatment will not be offset by trade creation
in other markets. The EU maintains most of the significant barriers that
will be removed by the UR agreement. Thus, one of the primary markets to
be opened by trade reform is the EU, already the primary market for ACP
exports.24
The impact on developing countries in aggregate is expected to be positive, but uneven. Selected studies find that some--the least developed food importing countries--could be negatively affected in the short run. The Overseas Development Institute believes that even allowing for underestimation and restrictive assumptions, the total effect on developing countries is not likely to be massive. The studies agree that whether and how much a country benefits from the agreement depends directly on the extent of each country's own trade liberalization. Creating a favorable climate for foreign investment, allowing free movement of labor among industrial sectors, and lowering trade barriers which encourage inefficient production practices all will contribute to increased gains from the agreement.
Agricultural results of the UR agreement should be assessed after enactment of the 1995 U.S. omnibus farm legislation and implementation of European adjustments to trade reform. The impact of the agreement on food aid, export credit programs and developing country food security can be fully understood only in this larger context. Whether trade reform has a significant impact of foreign food aid programs, U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. foreign policy, U.S. foreign trade and investment activities/programs may be a subject of hearings and debate as implementation of the agreement progresses.
Future issues likely to surface within the WTO framework include linkages
between trade policy on the one hand, and environment and labor issues
on the other. The newly established power of developing countries in WTO,
however, could mean that these politically sensitive issues may be suppressed,
despite the view of many international environment and labor experts that
serious discussions need to take place.
Copyright 1998 National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade
2-[ Estimates cited in this report are drawn prirnarily from the following quantitative studies: Joseph F. Francois, Bradley McDonald, and Hakan Nordstrom, Assessing the Uruguay Round , presented at the World Bank Conference: The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, January 26-27, 1995, Washington, D.C. Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F. Rutherford, and David G. Tarr, Quantifying the Uruguay Round , presented at the World Bank Conference: The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, January 26-27, 1995, Washington, D.C. Ian Golden, Odin Knudsen and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Trade Liberalization: Global Economic Implications , Paris: OECD Development Centre; Washington: World Bank, 1993. T. Nguyen, C. Perroni, and R. Wigle, An Evaluation of the Draft Final Act of the Uruguay Round , Economic Journal, Vol. 103, November 1993, pp. 1540-49. OECD, Assessing the Effects of the Uruguay Round , Trade Policy Issues 2 (Paris, 1993). GATT Secretariat, An Analysis of the Proposed Uruguay Round Agreement , With Particular Emphasis on Aspects of Interest to Developing Countries , MTN.TNC/W/W122 (Geneva, November 29, 1993). Alan V. Deardorff, Economic Effects of Quota and Tariff Reductions , Brookings Occasional Paper: The New GATT, Implications for the United States , 1994, pp. 7-27. Sheila Page, Michael Davenport and Adrian Hewitt, The GATT Uruguay Round: Effects on Developing Countries , Overseas Development Institute, London, 199l.]
3-[ Ian Golden, Odin Knudsen and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Trade Liberalization: Global Economic Implications , Paris: OECD Development Centre; Washington: World Bank, 1993.]
4-[ Francesca Nelson, Food Security and the GATT , Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, November 1994.]
6-[ Uwe W. Corsepius and Clinton R. Shiells, The Uruguay Round: Results and Implications , Annex I, World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, May 1994.]
7-[ For more detail on the history and agreement provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement, see CRS Issue Brief Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round , IB86147.]
8-[ UNCTAD, Handbook of Trade Control Measures of Developing countries: A Statistical Analysis of Trade Control Measures of Developing Countries 1987 UNCTAD/DDM/Misc 2, Geneva.]
9-[ ACP consists of 69 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and Oceania that have signed onto the Lome Convention with the European Union. Countries not included are Samoa, Cook Islands, Guam, Pacific Islands, and Cuba.]
10-[ Sheila Page, Michael Davenport and Adrian Hewitt, The GATT Uruguay Round: Effects on Developing Countries , Overseas Development Institute Special Report, April 1992.]
11-[ Statement by the Director-General of GATT to the Development Committee, Madrid, Spain, Oct. 3, 1994.]
12-[ Ingco, Merlinda. Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round: One Step Forward, One Step Back? World Bank Conference, Jan. 26-27, 1995, pp. 22-24.]
13-[ For more detail on agriculture provisions of the Uruguay Round agreement, see CRS Issue brief: Agriculture in the GATT , IB89027.]
14-[ Nelson, Francesca, Food Security and the GATT , Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, date?]
15-[ For more detail on manufacturing provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement See CRS issue brief, Uruguay Round: Industry Issues, AK.]
16-[ Alexander J. Yeats, What are OECD Trade Preferences Worth to Sub-Saharan Africa?, Policy Working Paper 1254, The World Bank, Februaly 1994; and ODI.]
18-[ Four multilateral agreements--governrnent procurement, bovine, aircraft, and daily--are exceptions that WTO members can agree to or not.]
19-[ For more detail on S&P issues in the UR agreement see CRS Report 94-512 SPR, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Safety Standards for Foods in the GATT Uruguay Round Accords , by Donna Vogt, June 1994.]
20-[ Association of South East Asian Nations includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.]
21-[ Goldin, Knudsen and van derMensbrugghe. Trade Liberalization:Global Economic Implications . Paris: OECD Development Centre. Washington: Wolld Bank, 1993.]
22-[ For more detail, see CRS report, Africa: Impact of the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements , by Raymond W. Copson, Carl W. Ek, and Susan Epstein, Oct. 3, 1994.]
23-[ Alexander J. Yeats, What are OECD Trade Preferences Worth to Sub-Saharan Africa?, Policy Working Paper 1254, The World Bank, February 1994.]
24-[ Overseas Development Institute, The GATT Uruguay
Round: Effects on Developing Countries , Sheila Page, Michael Davenport
and Adrian Hewitt, London, 1991, p. 16.]
Copyright 1998 National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade