3rd Conference: Labor Cooperation Agreement between Mexico Canada & US: Negotiation Prospects

Reproduced for the InterAm Database with permission of the

United States-Mexico Law Institute, Inc.

University of New Mexico School of Law

Albuquerque, New Mexico 97131-1431

tel: (505) 277-7825

fax: (505) 277-0068

The United States-Mexico Law Institute, Inc. is a non-profit corporation organized under the

laws of the State of New Mexico, U.S.A.

THE LABOR COOPERATION AGREEMENT AMONG MEXICO, CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES: ITS NEGOTIATION AND PROSPECTS

Robert E. Herzstein [FNa1]

I. INTRODUCTION

The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) [FN1] represents
the first time in the modern trading era (i.e., the period since the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) [FN2] was adopted) that an international
agreement on labor has been linked to a trade agreement, both politically and
legally. The labor agreement was negotiated entirely after the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) [FN3] was signed, with a different President and
negotiating team on the United States side. It sets up some novel institutions
and commits the three governments-United States, Mexico and Canada-to a program
of cooperation on some of the most novel issues presently faced by
international economic policymakers and politicians. These issues are likely to
be the subject of serious attention for international businessmen, labor unions
and political leaders during the next five to ten years.
The labor side agreement has the potential for significant achievements, but
also for creating some of the more serious difficulties in the U.S.-Mexico
trading relationship. Yet it was drafted rather rapidly and under conditions of
intense political controversy. Thus, it is useful to have a brief understanding
of its historical and political context.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NAALC

The idea of using a trade agreement between countries to influence labor
policies was raised in the early decades of this century. [FN4] However, by and
large, the international institutions and agreements for regulating trade and
for regulating labor matters developed on separate tracks. On one track is the
GATT, and on another is the International Labor *122 Organization (ILO)
[FN5] and the many agreements it sponsored. Another example is the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, [FN6] negotiated only eight years ago, in
which there was no suggestion of a labor side agreement.
The impact of trade liberalization on workers during the GATT era (i.e.,
since World War II) was not neglected. It was addressed in all the trade
negotiations by putting transitional measures into trade-liberalizing
agreements. Tariffs were lowered gradually, allowing adjustment of workers and
firms before the full impact of competition created by the trade liberalizing
agreement was felt. The impact of trade liberalization on workers was also
often addressed in the domestic adjustment programs of individual countries
that were parties to trade agreements, through labor retraining programs and
other adjustment measures.
The suggestion of a free trade agreement between the United States and
Mexico, which arose in 1989 and 1990 in early meetings between President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari and President George Bush, also contained no reference to
inclusion of labor or environmental issues in the agreement. [FN7]
The issue was first raised in the spring of 1991, when President Bush had to
obtain congressional acquiescence for a two-year extension of the so-called
fast track authority, thus allowing time for him to negotiate NAFTA. His fast
track negotiating authority was coming to an end, and there was a provision in
the law allowing a two-year extension if it was not disapproved by Congress
within a certain period of time. [FN8] When he made that request in early
spring of 1991, a number of members of Congress supported the concerns
expressed by labor unions and environmental organizations that free trade with
Mexico would expose U.S. industry and workers to competition from companies in
Mexico which did not have to comply with standards applicable to United States-
based companies. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt articulated these views
as the Democratic leader, [FN9] and they were widely shared among members of
Congress.
On March 7, 1991, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, then Chairman of the Finance
Committee and the Senate leader on trade matters, wrote President Bush a
carefully prepared letter. [FN10] In this letter, Senator Bentsen expressed
*123 various concerns that were circulating in Congress and asked President
Bush to give assurances to Congress on how he would handle these concerns in
the course of negotiating a free trade agreement with Mexico. [FN11] Of course,
what Senator Bentsen had in mind was, "Let's take care of these issues early.
Give them your attention and give the Congress the kind of reassurances it
needs so that in the approval of the fast track authority for the negotiation
with Mexico, we can know that those issues are going to be adequately taken
care of and we can smooth the way for negotiation of a trade agreement and for
eventual approval of it by Congress." One of the prominent issues identified in
Senator Bentsen's letter was, of course, the adequacy of labor standards and
worker rights in Mexico. [FN12]
A little less than two months later, on May 1, 1991, President Bush sent a
carefully crafted response to Senator Bentsen, [FN13] which was circulated
throughout Congress. On the labor issue President Bush wrote, "President
Salinas has ... made it clear to me that his objective in pursuing free trade
is to better the lives of Mexican working people. Mexico has strong laws
regulating labor standards and worker rights. Beyond what Mexico is already
doing, we will work through new initiatives to expand U.S.-Mexico labor
cooperation." [FN14] The phrase, "U.S.-Mexico labor cooperation," signaled a
commitment by the President to the Congress. In the appendices to his response,
President Bush reported that the U.S. and Mexican Secretaries of Labor were
prepared to sign a memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation and joint
action on a series of concerns of workers, including health and safety
measures, labor standards and enforcement, labor conflicts, exchange of
statistical information, and various other areas of concern. [FN15]
On May 9, 1991, Majority Leader Gephardt announced that he would
support the fast track extension on the basis of President Bush's commitment.
[FN16] He did make clear that he reserved the right to oppose the agreement
when it came back to Congress after being negotiated if it did not achieve
certain goals. [FN17] With that kind of support, the fast track extension that
President Bush requested was granted and the negotiations began.
*124 When the NAFTA negotiations were completed in the fall of 1992, the
Bush Administration gave a further report to Congress on progress under the
Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Cooperation. [FN18] That report describes
extensive cooperative activities and improvements achieved in labor standards
and enforcement in Mexico. It details how there had been improvement in
Mexico's own administration of its laws. It also reported on the establishment
of a new Consultative Commission on Labor Matters to oversee joint activities
and to serve as a forum for continued consultation. [FN19] It announced the
formation of a U.S. working group to receive complaints from U.S. labor unions
and others which could be taken up in the Consultative Commission. [FN20] Thus
President Bush, in effect, satisfied-or sought to satisfy-the concerns of
Congress through what he called a "program on labor cooperation." This was not
a binding agreement, but rather a memorandum of understanding and a program
worked out between the Secretaries of Labor of the two countries.
President Bush signed NAFTA on December 17, 1992. [FN21] President Bush's
plan had been to present NAFTA to Congress along with a report on progress
under the program on labor cooperation, to fulfill his May 1, 1991, commitment
to congressional leaders. The President would have sought to sell NAFTA and the
labor program to Congress in that fashion, but for a very important intervening
development-the electoral defeat of President Bush one month earlier. When Bush
signed NAFTA in 1992, he was a "lame duck" and was not in a position to send
NAFTA to Congress. That would be a task for the new President.
This was the first instance, since the establishment of our modern trading
system, in which a trade agreement signed by one President had to be presented
to Congress by a different President. This situation put President Bill Clinton
in a tight political spot.
Clinton had been, during the campaign, quite ambivalent about his support for
NAFTA. In early October 1992, he gave a campaign speech in which he announced
his support for NAFTA. [FN22] But his support was qualified. He said, in
effect, that free trade has brought big economic benefits and free trade with
Mexico is very promising, but NAFTA fails to address important potential
adverse consequences of free trade with Mexico, one of them being certain
impacts on workers. [FN23] Therefore, he called for negotiation of supplemental
agreements, requiring each country to enforce its own laws on environment and
worker standards. He stated *125 that NAFTA would be bad for the United
States if implemented as Bush had planned, but good for the country if
implemented with the proposed supplemental agreements. [FN24] This rhetoric
focused the political attention, including the debate about the desirability of
NAFTA, not on NAFTA itself (a 2,000-page, painfully negotiated document), but
on the proposed side agreements on labor and environmental consequences of
NAFTA. President Clinton thus raised high expectations for what he could
achieve on these issues.
Clinton took office in January 1993, and the negotiation of the side
agreements started in late spring. [FN25] There was intense pressure from some
members of Congress, who urged President Clinton to obtain very strong
agreements, i.e., "with teeth." This became the fashionable test of whether
they would be "good" agreements. The separate agreements on labor and on the
environment [FN26] were signed by the member countries in September 1993, and
the NAFTA package was then presented to Congress. It was approved in November
1993, in a dramatic and very close vote. [FN27]
Despite the labor side agreement, Majority Leader Gephardt had decided not to
support NAFTA; he became the principal leader of the opposition. [FN28] The
labor unions continued to oppose NAFTA, declaring that they were not satisfied
with the side agreement. Indeed, a majority of Democrats in the Congress did
not support it. NAFTA was approved only by virtue of the strong support of the
business community and some 130 Republican members of the House of
Representatives, who joined the 100 supportive Democrats. [FN29]

III. OVERVIEW OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NAALC

The NAALC seeks, first, to establish a broad cooperative program, [FN30]
building on the Bush-Salinas memorandum of understanding and the Bush program
of cooperation. But then it goes further and establishes certain obligations.
The fundamental obligation is that each of the three parties-the United States,
Canada and Mexico-is to ensure that its own labor laws provide for "high labor
standards," [FN31] while recognizing that each has the right to establish its
own standards. In other words, the Agreement does not set a uniform standard on
labor practices; it says *126 that the parties recognize that each country
is in charge of its own labor law programs, but each will attempt to achieve a
high level of protection. [FN32] The agreement does set forth some labor
principles which were endorsed by all three countries as a sort of guideline
for defining "high labor standards." [FN33]
The Agreement also calls on each government to promote compliance and to
effectively enforce its own laws. [FN34] That is perhaps the central legal
obligation of the Agreement. The Agreement also provides that each party will
provide an opportunity for private persons to submit complaints to the
government concerning lapses of labor law observance, [FN35] along with an
opportunity for access to administrative and judicial tribunals for enforcing
the labor law rights of individuals. [FN36]
It is important to note the kinds of obligations that were not included in
the Agreement. There is no obligation to have the same rights in every country.
There is also no obligation to have the same institutions or procedures for
enforcing them, nor is there an obligation to have the same quality or style of
labor management relations. Finally, there is explicit rejection of the notion
of extraterritorial enforcement by any party in the jurisdiction of another.
[FN37]
The processes the Agreement establishes for achieving compliance with
the obligations can be confusing. Table 1, shown below, is an effort to outline
these procedures. The chart does not include the whole affirmative cooperation
program, but only the procedures designed to achieve compliance with the
obligations each party has undertaken.
First, there is a category of activities which are called "Cooperative
Consultations." [FN38] A National Administrative Office (NAO) is established in
each country. [FN39] The NAO of any one country may request consultations with
its counterpart in relation to the other party's "labor law" or its
"administration," or "labor market conditions" in its territory. [FN40] This
provision establishes a broad opportunity for the three NAOs to interact with
each other and learn about each country's system.
If a problem arises on a particular matter, the Agreement then allows a party
to request a Ministerial Consultation with another party on any matter within
the scope of the Agreement. [FN41] That is the initial and primary way to take
up a problem. If this Consultation does not take care of an issue, the
Agreement moves on to a process called "Evaluations." [FN42] But, as the chart
shows, the universe of topics that can be taken *128 up in an Evaluation is
not as broad as it is for Ministerial Consultations. The Ministerial
Consultation can be on any matter within the scope of the Agreement, [FN43] but
the Evaluations can only cover the enforcement of laws relating to the topics
listed at the top of the middle column on the chart. [FN44]

TABLE 1
NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION
Cooperative Consultations, Evaluations and Dispute Resolution
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. COOPERATIVE II. EVALUATIONS III. RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
CONSULTATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. A NAO may If matter not resolved a. After ECE report presented, a
request through ministerial Party may request consultation
consultations consultations, a Party regarding whether there has
with another may request formation been a persistent patter of
NAO in relation of Evaluation Committee failure by another Party to
to the other of Experts (ECE). ECE enforce its laws on:
Party's labor may analyze only
law, its enforcement of laws
administration, relating to:
or labor market
conditions in
its territory.
(Art. 21)
. occupational safety and . occupational safety and health
health
. prohibitions on forced . child labor
labor
. protection for children . minimum wage. (Art. 27)
. minimum wages
. employment
discrimination
. equal pay for men and
women
. migrant worker
Copr. (C) West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt. works

3 USMEXLJ 121 AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY PAGE 124
(CITE AS: 3 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 121, *128)
protection
Any matter reviewed by an
ECE must be
trade-related and
covered by
mutually-recognized
labor laws in the
disputing countries.
(Art. 23)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. A Party may b. If consulting Parties fail to
request resolve the dispute, either may
consultations request special session of
at the Council of Ministers, which
ministerial will attempt to mediate. (Art.
level on any 28)
matter within
scope of the
agreement.
(Art. 22)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ECE consists of outside c. If matter not resolved, a
neutral persons Party can request formation of
selected from a roster arbitral panel. The complaint
developed by the must be:
parties. "The ECE shall
analyze, in the light
of the objectives of
this agreement and in a
non-adversarial manner,
patterns of practice by
each party in the
enforcement of [the
standard in question]
as they apply to the
matter under
consultation." (Art.
23)
. trade-related; and
. relate to matter covered by
mutually recognized laws.
Panel will prepare initial and
final report with opinion and
recommendations. (Art. 29)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. If panel finds failure to
enforce, parties have 60 days
to agree on action plan; if no
agreement, the panel can be
reconvened and may approve a
plan submitted by a party or
establish its own. (Art. 38)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. If party fails to implement an
action plan, the panel can
impose a monetary assessment
against the government. (Art.
39)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
f. If U.S. or Mexico fails to pay
fine, other parties may
withdraw trade benefits
equivalent in value; Canada
will allow enforcement of fine
in domestic courts. (Art. 41)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If the United States, for example, feels that Mexico is not properly
enforcing an occupational safety or health law, the United States may call for
an Evaluation. This is accomplished by forming an Evaluation Committee of
Experts (ECE). [FN45] An ECE is drawn from a roster, previously prepared by the
parties, of independent outside persons with expertise in the matters that
might come up under the list of laws that are subject to Evaluations. When a
particular issue is ready for consideration, the ECE is picked (by a process
set forth in the Agreement) [FN46] and asked to investigate.
An important and interesting feature of this evaluation process is that the
ECE analyzes not just the practices of the complained-of party; it is directed
to analyze, in light of the objectives of the Agreement and in a non-
adversarial manner, patterns of practice by each party in the enforcement of
the standard in question. [FN47] For example, if the formation of the ECE is
stimulated by the fact that the United States has a concern about Mexico's
enforcement of its occupational and safety and health laws in a particular
context, the ECE will look into how each of the parties is handling that
matter. The objective was to promote cooperation and a help-each-other approach
to these issues, rather than a confrontational and accusatory approach.
The ECE issues an evaluation report; [FN48] then there are further
consultations in an effort to resolve the issue. [FN49] If the issue is not
resolved at that stage and it falls under one of three kinds of laws [FN50]
(which are indicated at the top of the third column in Table 1), then it may be
made the subject of dispute resolution. So the universe of topics covered by
the processes of the Agreement narrows as the parties move from column 1 to
column 2 on the chart, and then it narrows further as they move from column 2
to column 3. A controversy reaches the end of the road with an ECE, at column
2, unless the matter of concern to one party involves "occupational safety and
health," "child labor," or "minimum wage[s]." [FN51] If it involves one of
those categories, it can move *129 on to dispute resolution under column 3
if certain other conditions are also present: the dispute has to be "trade-
related," and must also relate to a matter covered by mutually-recognized
laws. [FN52] It cannot, for example, be a problem of nonenforcement of
occupational, safety and health laws in a situation with no impact on trade
between the three countries. Moreover, as indicated at the very top of column
3, the topic going to dispute resolution must involve a "persistent pattern" of
failure by another party to enforce its laws. [FN53]
This completes an overview of the processes that the Agreement establishes
for achieving compliance with the commitments, aspirations and obligations
contained in the Agreement.
Does the Agreement create a risk that its processes will be used by labor
unions, who sought to defeat NAFTA, to pursue protectionist objectives? That is
the topic of debate, at least in Washington, at the present time for those who
are following the Agreement and its potential impact on NAFTA. On its face, the
Agreement appears to raise no opportunity for that. It stresses cooperation,
even in its title, and it requires an effort to resolve problems about labor
law enforcement through several stages of consultation and evaluation. In
addition, it puts the NAO of each government in a position to filter out
complaints that are lacking in substance under the Agreement, or that seem to
be filed for publicity or harassment or for the purpose of achieving protection
against import competition. Moreover, it provides for early consultation at the
ministerial level. The Agreement deliberately attempts to thrust an issue to
the top at an early stage, to enable the issue to be dealt with quickly before
it becomes politicized.
Another feature of the Agreement that is designed to guard against
protectionist abuse is that the first investigation of a matter is undertaken
by neutral outsiders selected from a panel-the ECE. [FN54] As noted, the ECE
looks at the complaint in light of the practices of each country. [FN55] This
procedure recognizes the reality that on any given day there are probably many
labor law violations in each of the three countries and that if mere
accusations of violations can be the subject of examination in the Agreement,
the Agreement could become a vehicle for unending disputes, creating an ongoing
controversial relationship rather than a cooperative one. So instead of asking
what went wrong, the ECE is encouraged to ask how the three countries are doing
with regard to the standard in question and how they can work together better.
Thus, the ECE process aims at maximizing the opportunity to improve labor law
enforcement throughout North America.
The Agreement reserves the ultimate sanction of tariff increases [FN56] for
use as a last resort-only on the most serious problems when, as shown
*130 at the bottom of column 3 of Table 1, (i) there is a persistent pattern
by one country of failure to enforce one of those three categories of laws on a
trade-related matter; [FN57] (ii) a panel has set up a proposed remedy, or an
action plan; [FN58] (iii) the party concerned has failed to implement the
action plan; [FN59] and (iv) the party concerned has failed to pay a penalty.
[FN60] Only at that time could a trade sanction be imposed. [FN61] So here,
too, the effort of the negotiators was to minimize the use of sanctions and the
resulting injury to the good relationships under NAFTA.

IV. RECENT EVENTS

As of August 1994, three petitions have been filed with the U.S. NAO by U.S.
labor unions, making allegations against three different companies operating in
Mexico: General Electric, Honeywell and Sony. [FN62] The allegations against
General Electric and Honeywell relate to the right of workers to freely
organize, the assertion being that the companies punished or fired workers who
sought to organize their co-workers. [FN63] The U.S. NAO agreed to consider
those two petitions and held a public hearing on September 12, 1994. [FN64] The
United States business community argued that the petitions should not have been
accepted because they did not allege the kind of enforcement shortcomings that
the Agreement is designed to examine. They also argued that (1) the NAO should
not have held a hearing; (2) that an NAO hearing is not the process
contemplated by the Agreement; (3) that the NAO is supposed to be a filter and
not a tribunal; and (4) that the first step in actually trying to resolve an
issue should be Ministerial Consultations (or possibly consultations between
the NAOs) and not a public and rather confrontational hearing. [FN65] Finally,
the business community argued that the public hearing lends itself to abuses of
the Agreement by unions that, having unsuccessfully opposed NAFTA, now want to
use the side agreement to harass companies *131 investing in Mexico in order
to discourage such investment and, therefore, to undermine NAFTA. [FN66]

V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LABOR CHALLENGES

How these complaints and others are handled will have important
implications for this Agreement, for NAFTA and, perhaps more importantly, for
the entire way in which the United States pursues international agreements on
important social issues in connection with trade negotiations.
The idea of linking trade liberalization with achievement of social goals is
a subject of continuing controversy. Recently, for example, there was much
debate about whether to deny most-favored-nation tariff treatment to China
because of its human rights record. [FN67] Linkage has also come up with the
U.S. proposal that the new World Trade Organization be active on labor and
environmental issues. [FN68] And the recent Congressional debate on extension
of fast track negotiating authority for the President has turned decisively on
whether future trade agreements will be linked to agreements on labor, the
environment and possibly other social issues. [FN69] The result of this
controversy was the end of the fast track, at least for the time-being.

VI. CONCLUSION

We are at a crucial stage, in which the legitimacy of linking agreements on
labor, the environment and perhaps other social questions to trade agreements
is in question. If the NAALC does not function as it was designed, and promotes
confrontation rather than cooperation, this will lead the community that
supports trade liberalization to conclude that side agreements are a bad idea.
If the NAALC is implemented in a way that fosters cooperative problem-solving,
it will demonstrate to both the skeptics (of whom there are many) and to the
believers that side agreements make sense and should be adopted as an integral
part of U.S. international economic policy.

FNa1. Member, Shearman & Sterling, Washington, D.C.

FN1. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC or "the Agreement"].

FN2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 10, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
reprinted in 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 9 (Stephen
Zamora & Ronald A. Brand, eds., 1990).

FN3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., H.R.
Doc. No. 103-159 (effective Jan. 1, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].

FN4. See generally Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in
International Trade, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 165 (1993).

FN5. The ILO is a United Nations-related body that fashions labor rights and
labor standards by government, business and labor. For a concise history of the
ILO, see DAVID A. MORSE, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ILO AND ITS ROLE IN
THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1969).

FN6. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can.,
reprinted in 2 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 359 (Stephen
Zamora & Ronald A. Brand, eds., 1990).

FN7. See Understanding between the Government of the United Mexican States and
the Government of the United States of America Regarding Trade and Investment
Facilitation Talks, Action Plan for Implementation of the October 3 Mandate to
Initiate Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks, & Joint Communique on Trade
and Investment, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1325 (1989).

FN8. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 15 (1989).

FN9. Congressman Richard Gephardt, Statement on Fast-Track Authority (May 9,
1991).

FN10. Bentsen, Rostenkowski Urge Bush to Address Environment, Labor & RTA
Talks, 109 U.S. TRADE, Mar. 8, 1991, at 21-26.

FN11. Id.

FN12. Id.

FN13. President George Bush, Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in
Connection with the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, 27
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 536-37 (May 1, 1991).

FN14. President George Bush, Letter Accompanying the Response of the
Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a North
American Free Trade Agreement, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 537 (May 1, 1991).

FN15. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Cooperation between the Department
of Labor of the United States of America and the Secretariat of Labor and
Social Welfare of the United Mexican States, attached to Response of the
Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a North
American Free Trade Agreement, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 536-37 (May 1, 1991).

FN16. Gephardt Supports Fast Track But Leaves Door Open for Future Amendments,
9 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 10, 1991, at 18-19.

FN17. Id.

FN18. Bilateral Cooperation on Labor Issues: Labor Standards, Worker Health and
Safety, and Worker Rights, printed in Report of the Administration on the North
American Free Trade Agreement and Actions Taken in Fulfillment of the May 1,
1991 Commitments (Sept. 18, 1992).

FN19. Id.

FN20. Id. at 16-17, app. A.

FN21. President Bush Signs NAFTA at Ceremony; Clinton to Meet with Salinas in
January, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2162 (Dec. 23, 1992).

FN22. Governor Bill Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs,
Address at North Carolina State University (Oct. 4, 1992).

FN23. Id.

FN24. Id.

FN25. Negotiations of NAFTA Side Pacts Set Timetable to Finish Work by Summer,
11 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 19, 1993, at 1-2.

FN26. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993).

FN27. See 139 CONG. REC. S16,712 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. H10,
048 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993).

FN28. Dan Balz, Gephardt's "Quiet" Crusade Against NAFTA, WASH. POST, Oct. 6,
1993, at A6.

FN29. House Passes NAFTA With Ease, Giving Clinton a Major Policy Victory, 46
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 1993, at 51-52; Kenneth J. Cooper, Backers Claim
Momentum to Carry NAFTA in House; Trade Pact Split Parties, Crossed Political
Lines, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1993, at A1, A10.

FN30. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 1.

FN31. Id. art. 2.

FN32. See id.

FN33. Id. annex 1.

FN34. Id. art. 3.

FN35. Id.

FN36. Id. art. 4.

FN37. Id. art. 42.

FN38. Id. arts. 20-22.

FN39. Id. art. 15.

FN40. Id. art. 21.

FN41. Id. art. 22.

FN42. Id. art. 23.

FN43. Id. art. 22.

FN44. Id. art. 23.

FN45. Id.

FN46. Id. art. 24.

FN47. Id. art. 23.

FN48. Id. arts. 25-26.

FN49. Id. art. 27.

FN50. Id. These are occupational safety and health, child labor and minimum
wage laws.

FN51. Id.

FN52. Id. art. 29.

FN53. Id. art. 27.

FN54. Id. art. 24.

FN55. Id. art. 23.

FN56. Id. annex 41B.

FN57. Id. art. 38.

FN58. Id.

FN59. Id. art. 39.

FN60. Id. art. 41.

FN61. See id.

FN62. First Complaints Filed Under Labor Side Accord, 1 INSIDE NAFTA, Feb. 23,
1994, at 3; NAO Delays Hearings on Worker Rights at GE, Honeywell Plants, 1
INSIDE NAFTA, Aug. 24, 1994, at 5.

FN63. See Complaint Before the United States National Administrative Office, In
Re: Honeywell, Inc. (Feb. 14, 1994); Submission and Request for Review, In Re:
General Electric Company (Feb. 14, 1994). Styled as "complaints" by the
submitting labor organizations, the Teamsters' submission against Honeywell is
Case No. 940001 (on file with U.S. NAO) and the Electrical Workers' submission
against General Electric is Case No. 940002 (on file with U.S. NAO). See also
First Complaints Filed Under Labor Side Accord, 1 INSIDE NAFTA, Feb. 23, 1994,
at 3.

FN64. U.S. Office to Hold Hearings, Issue Report in NAFTA Labor Complaints, 1
INSIDE NAFTA, Apr. 20, 1994, at 8; NAO Delays Hearings on Worker Rights at GE,
Honeywell Plants, 1 INSIDE NAFTA, Aug. 24, 1994, at 7-8.

FN65. See, e.g., Statement by Edward E. Potter, U.S. Council for International
Business, to U.S. NAO (Aug. 31, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).

FN66. See David R. Sands, New Panel Hears NAFTA Labor Disputes, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1994, at B7.

FN67. Loan Signals China Close to Meeting Human Rights Conditions, 12 INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Apr. 22, 1994, at 14-15.

FN68. House Bill Calls for WTO Committee on Trade's Labor Rights, 12 INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Apr. 22, 1994, at 11-12.

FN69. Pro-Labor, Environment Democrat, Seek to Exclude Fast Track, 12 INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Sept. 2, 1994, at 5-6.